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SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION DECODERS: CAN
CALIFORNIA PROHIBIT THEIR MANUFACTURE
AND SALE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the telecommunications industry has
experienced phenomenal growth. Commercial television's
gross revenues have more than doubled,' those of cable televi-
sion have quadrupled,2 and cable systems now are linked to
over fifteen million subscribers, twenty percent of the nation's
television households. s
New television ventures such as over-the-air subscription
television and Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) television of-
fer viewers additional programming alternatives and investors
new product markets. There are presently twenty-four sub-
scription television (STV) stations on the air; there were none
as late as 1977.' Industry analysts project a 20 percent annual
growth rate over the next decade.'
STV, alone among the new television ventures, operates
in the standard broadcast frequency spectrum of 470-890
Mhz.6 To date, only STV has been classified as "broadcast-
ing" by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).7
Ironically, STV licensees, who only 20 years ago fought for
this status and argued before the FCC that "broadcasting re-
© 1982 by M. Manuel Fishman.
1. 1980 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK A-2.
2. Id. at G-3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at B-147. See also BROADCASTING, Oct. 5, 1981 at 24.
5. BROADCASTING, Dec. 22, 1980 at 80.
6. Domestic broadcast frequencies are allocated as follows:
535 - 1,605 Khz - am radio
54 - 72 Mhz - tv channels 2-4 (VHF)
76 - 88 Mhz - tv channels 5-6 (VHF)
88 - 108 Mhz - fm radio
174 - 216 Mhz - tv channels 7-13 (VHF)
470 - 890 Mhz - tv channels 14-83 (UHF)
S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 52 (3d ed. 1976).
7. In re Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Provide for Sub-
scription Television Service, 3 F.C.C.2d 1, 8 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Further
Notice].
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mains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is un-
able to view programs without special equipment," today ar-
gue that STV programming is "intended for the exclusive use
of paying customers" and, therefore, is not broadcasting.
This sudden about-face is due, in part, to the emergence of
home terminal and decoder distributors, labelled by STV op-
erators as "pirates."' 0 These distributors manufacture and sell
receivers capable of unscrambling the STV signal, thereby
permitting direct reception of subscription programming. STV
operators fear they could lose up to a quarter of a million dol-
lars each year in subscriber revenues if home terminal decoder
dealers continue to sell their product."
Many people were surprised when, on September 30,
1980, California Governor Jerry Brown acted against the rec-
ommendation of his Legal Affairs Department and signed into
law A.B. 3475, adding section 593(e) to the California Penal
Code. 12 The statute prohibits the manufacture and sale of any
device used to intercept or decode any over-the-air subscrip-
tion television station transmission.' In its first court chal-
lenge, in which an electronics retailer sought to enjoin en-
forcement of the statute by the City of Anaheim, section
593(e) was upheld as a valid exercise of the State's police
power. " Recent federal circuit courts of appeals decisions
have held that the sale of STV decoders is prohibited by the
8. Id. at 10.
9. See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th
Cir. 1980).
10. Letter from Arthur Greenberg to Assemblyman Meldon E. Levine (Mar. 18,
1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
11. Id.
12. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1332 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(e)).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(e) reads in full:
Every person who for profit knowingly and willfully manufactures, dis-
tributes, or sells any device or plan of kit for a device, or printed circuit
containing circuitry for interception or decoding with the purpose or in-
tention of facilitating interception or decoding of any over-the-air trans-
mission by a subscription television service made pursuant to authority
granted by the Federal Communications Commission which is not au-
thorized by the subscription television service is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 90 days, or
both.
14. Robbins v. Hicks, No. 34-30-12 (Orange County Super. Ct., Nov. 24, 1980)
(order denying preliminary injunction).
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Federal Communications Act of 1934.18
The purpose of this comment is threefold. First, it will
review the legislative history of A.B. 3475 and analyze the
statute's wording. Second, the comment will address the issue
of whether the Federal Communications Act ' preempts state
action in this field. Finally, the first amendment issues raised
by broadcasting regulation are discussed in the context of a
framework for future technological developments in the
broadcast industry.
II. WHAT IS STV?
To place STV in its proper context, it is important to dis-
tinguish it from other communications media, such as cable
television, Multi-Distribution Point Services (MDS), and Di-
rect Broadcast Satellite Service (DBS).
A. STV Broadcasting
Subscription television is a form of broadcasting. It is
characterized by the transmission of programming in scram-
bled or encoded form, and its intelligible reception requires an
"unscrambling" device. 17 Presently, the FCC requires STV
licensees to lease decoders to subscribers, ' but the Commis-
sion is reexamining this requirement."B STV subscribers are
charged a flat monthly fee by the licensee for the privilege of
program-viewing and as a rental charge for the unscrambling
device. There is no novel technology inherent in subscription
television broadcasting. The STV "unscrambling" device,
called a decoder, can be attached to any standard television
set.
While consideration of subscription television began in
1927,10 it was not until June, 1962 that the first STV televi-
15. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1976)). See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.
1980) (manufacture and sale of STV decoders violates 47 U.S.C. § 605); But see Na-
tional Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
16. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
17. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 1 n.1.
18. Over-The-Air Subscription Television Operations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(f3)
(1980).
19. In re Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations in Regard to Sec-
tion 73.642(a)(3) and Other Aspects of the Subscription Television Service, 67
F.C.C.2d 202, 206 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Other Aspects of STV].
20. In re Amendment of Part 3 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to
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sion station commenced limited operations."1 All STV licen-
sees operate within the standard broadcast frequency band,
and most are licensed to UHF channels.2 2
B. Cable TV Operations
Cable television began in the early 1950's as a substitute
for over-the-air television in communities where, as a result of
mountainous terrain, broadcast signals could not be re-
ceived.28 Cable television completely dispenses with the over-
the-air radiation of electromagnetic signals, utilizing instead
co-axial cable to carry its signal to subscribers. The FCC clas-
sifies cable television systems as "non-broadcast" facilities.2 4
Cable systems operate not only as master community anten-
nas for the reception of television broadcast signals, they also
originate their own programming, referred to as "cablecast-
ing." Cable television systems serving communities with over
3500 subscribers must maintain a minimum twenty channel
capacity." Cable technology also permits the reservation of
certain channels for subscription programming.
C. MDS Communications
MDS is a common carrier service operating in the 2150 -
2162 Mhz frequency band which transmits omnidirectionally
to fixed receivers with directive antennas. MDS signals are
broadcast, in the sense that electromagnetic signals are trans-
Provide for Subscription Television Service - First Report, 23 F.C.C. 531, 538 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as First Report].
21. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 2.
22. All presently licensed STV stations operate on UHF channels. See 1980
BROADCASTING YEARBOOK B-147. See also In re Amendment of Part 3 of the Commis-
sions Rules and Regulations to Provide for Subscription Television Service - Third
Report, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Third Report]: "If Subscription
Television successfully demonstrated a capacity to make a desireable contribution to
the television service, it might well provide fresh impetus to the utilization of many of
the now idle UHF channels." Id. at 268.
23. SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE 23-34 (1971).
24. Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1980).
25. Id. at § 76.252(a)(1).
26. In re Amendments of Parts 1, 2, 21 and 43 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations to Provide for Licensing and Regulation of Common Carrier Radio Sta-
tions in the Multipoint Distribution Service-Report and Order, 45 F.C.C.2d 616,
616-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Regulation of Common Carrier]; See also Public
Notice, Unauthorized Interception and Use of Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS)
Transmissions (F.C.C., Jan. 24, 1979) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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mitted over the air and dissipate as they travel outwards. The
propagation characteristics of the high frequency MDS signal
requires a "directive" antenna, differentiating it from the
standard television broadcast signal. The FCC classifies MDS
as point-to-point transmission. The MDS operator may not
become substantially involved in program production or exert
any influence over the transmission's content.2 8 Neither
broadcasters nor cable television operators share this status.
Home Box Office makes extensive use of the MDS service for
program distribution to licensees who down-convert the mi-
crowave signal and redistribute it to subscribers via cable.
D. DBS and Satellite Communications
Still in its infancy is a proposed DBS network.2 9 When
operational, the system will transmit from four orbitting satel-
lites, one serving each time zone, and operate in the 12.2 -
12.7 Ghz frequency band. The satellite signal will be picked
up by a dish-shaped antenna, referred to as an "earth sta-
tion". As is the case with MDS antennas, each earth station
must be properly aligned and focused in the direction of a
particular satellite. Attached to the earth station will be a
down-converter to convert the 12 Ghz signal to one which can
be received by a television set. The signal bandwidth is also
large - 16 Mhz. This distinguishes DBS from conventional
and subscription television broadcasting, as the latter operate
within a 6 Mhz bandwidth on standard broadcast frequency
channels.
Domestic satellite communication service started in
1973.80 Today, all four United States television networks as
well as numerous individual programmers beam news, sports,
movies, advertising and stock reports to and from earth satel-
lites. 1 All existing domestic satellites, however, are classified
27. Regulation of Common Carrier, supra note 26, at 616.
28. Multipoint Distribution Service, 47 C.F.R. § 21.903 (1980).
29. See BROADCASTING, Dec. 22, 1980 at 23. Satellite Television Corp., a subsidi-
ary of COMSAT, submitted its systems application to the Federal Communications
Commission in December, 1980. Promoters optimistically expect to be operational by
1985. Id.
30. In re Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, 74
F.C.C.2d 205, 207 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Satellite Deregulation].
31. See Perle, Communications, Satellites & the Law, 27 BULL. CoPRIoHr
Soc'Y OF THE U.S.A. 325, 327 (1979); In re Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Sat-
ellite Earth Stations - of Inquiry, 70 F.C.C.2d 1460, 1460 n.1 (1979).
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as "fixed" satellites and operate as common carriers. 2 Re-
cently, the FCC deregulated ownership of receive-only earth
stations,"3 greatly expanding the potential for domestic satel-
lite communications. As a consequence, over 30 companies
have begun manufacturing, selling and installing these dish-
shaped antennas. Now, earth station entrepreneurs share
many of the legal problems faced by STV decoder
manufacturers."'
In contrasting STV with cable, MDS, or DBS, subscrip-
tion television represents the only service operating in the
standard broadcast frequency spectrum. Whereas STV autho-
rizations are issued only to commercial television broadcast
stations," cable television system ownership by commercial
television licensees is severely restricted." Although the FCC
expressly extended the "rules and policies applicable to regu-
lar television ... to subscription television operations, '37 it
regulates cable, MDS and satellite communications as non-
broadcast facilities. In enacting section 593(e), the California
Legislature overlooked these distinctions, and enacted a stat-
ute which undermines 25 years of FCC regulation over sub-
scription television.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF A.B. 3475
California State Assemblyman Meldon Levine introduced
Assembly Bill 3475 on May 1, 1980.SS A constituent and attor-
32. Satellite Deregulation, supra note 30, at 216.
33. Id. at 217. Three types of earth stations are used in domestic satellite sys-
tems: (a) transmit and receive; (b) receive only; (c) transmit only. In re Establish-
ment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities
- Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 137 (1970). By definition, receive-only earth
stations do not transmit; they are used only for the reception of satellite communica-
tions. Satellite Deregulation, supra note 30, at 217.
34. See Special Report: Small Earth Stations Blossom Into Big Business,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 22, 1980, at 31. "The legal questions concerning home terminals
center on Section 605 of the Communications Act. Pay cable suppliers and cable,
STV and MDS operators contend the section makes it illegal to intercept satellite
signals. Others, particularly the home terminal dealers, disagree." Id. at 34.
35. Over-The-Air Subscription Television Operations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.642(a)(1)
(1980).
36. Cable Television Cross Ownership, 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1980).
37. Over-The-Air Subscription Television Operation, 47 C.F.R. § 73.643(b)
(1980).
38. A.B. 3475, Cal. Legis., 1979-80 Reg. Sess., 2 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY 1953
(1980). Assemblyman Levine represents the 44th District, in Los Angeles.
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ney, Arthur Greenberg, suggested the proposed legislation."s
Interestingly, one of Greenberg's clients is National Subscrip-
tion Television, which operates KBSC-TV, channel 52, a sub-
scription television station in Los Angeles. The legislation was
referred to the Committee on Criminal Justice where it was
amended twice.40 Published Committee hearings are unavaila-
ble and pronouncements concerning legislative intent are
limited.
According to Legislative Assistant Annette Porini, the
principal drafter of the statute, the legislation was introduced
to provide protection for a growing concern in California's en-
tertainment industry. Unauthorized STV decoders were en-
dangering the STV economic base by thwarting fee collections
and the legislation was intended to protect the STV licensees'
property rights.4' California, which presently proscribes unau-
thorized connection to franchised cable television systems,42
sought to provide similar protections for subscription televi-
sion licensees by enacting AB 3475. Since STV was inade-
quately protected against unauthorized reception, Assembly-
man Levine labeled the bill an urgency measure, which
enabled it to take immediate effect upon enactment.4
The FCC reviewed an initial draft of the proposed legisla-
tion and found the proposed statute "not inconsistent with
the Communications Act of 1934. Such legislation will assist
in addressing the potentially serious and growing problem of
theft of Subscription Television services. ' 44
The Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice analysis of
AB 3475 noted "the purpose of this bill is to facilitate the
control of piracy of subscription television broadcasts ....
The unauthorized interception and decoding of subscription
television broadcasts deprives the television service and the
parties owning transmission rights for broadcasts such as mo-
39. Conversation with Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Levine, Ms. An-
nette Porini (Sacramento, Dec. 22, 1980).
40. A.B. 3475, Cal. Legis., 1979-80 Reg. Sess., 2 ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY 1953
(1980).
41. Conversation with Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Levine, Ms. An-
nette Porini (Sacramento, Dec. 22, 1980).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(d) (West Supp. 1980).
43. A.B. 3475, Cal. Legis., 1979-80 Reg. Sess., 2 AsSEMBLY FINAL HIsTORY 1953
(1980).
44. Telegram from Federal Communications Commission to Assemblyman Mel-
don Levine (June 6, 1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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tion pictures and sporting events of potential income. ' '45 The
report also noted that the proposed legislation would operate
to prohibit the sale, distribution and manufacture of "plans"
for such decoders. "This type of prohibition could readily im-
pinge on First Amendment rights by having a chilling effect
on the exchange of ideas and publication of information relat-
ing to the technology of intercepting and decoding devices." 46
Clearly, the committee was not unreservedly endorsing the
proposed statute.
The entertainment industry widely supported the legisla-
tion. Letters of support were received from the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters, the Motion Picture Association of
America, the Producers Guild of America, Walt Disney Pro-
ductions and the Screen Actors Guild.47 Ms. Kay Peters,
Chairperson, Screen Actors Guild Telecommunications Com-
mittee, testified before the Criminal Justice Committee in
support of A.B. 3475. Analogizing the problem facing STV op-
erators to car theft, Ms. Peters asked: "if someone is capable
of duplicating the key to your car, does that give them the
right to take your car?"4 8
The State Assembly passed on June 26, 1980 the bill, only
three weeks after the first committee hearing by the Criminal
Justice Committee. The Senate passed its version of the bill
on August 27, 1980. The Assembly approved a joint confer-
ence committee report on August 30, 1980 and the Senate fol-
lowed suit the next day.4'
On September 10, 1980 Governor Jerry Brown received
the proposed legislation.50 Two weeks later, the Governor's
Legal Affairs Department recommended the Governor veto
the legislation, noting that "strong arguments" could be made
in three areas:
1. Private reception of transmissions broadcast on pub-
lic airways should not be restricted;
45. Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis of A.B. 3475 (June
9, 1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
46. Id.
47. Conversation with Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Levine, Ms. An-
nette Porini (Sacramento, Dec. 22, 1980).
48. Testimony of Kay Peters before the Criminal Justice Committee regarding
A.B. 3475 (Sacramento, June 9, 1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).





2. Assuming, arguendo, that the broadcaster does have a
proprietary interest in the signal transmitted, this inter-
est should be protected through the statutes governing
copyrights and unfair competition, not the California Pe-
nal Code;
3. Even if the policy decision is made to impose criminal
sanctions on unauthorized access to the airwaves, this bill
is poorly drafted and may well result in the taking of ex-
isting business inventories without due process of law."
Despite the legal arguments raised by the Enrolled Bill Re-
port and the growing controversy over the legislation as re-
ported in the press,5 Governor Brown signed the bill into law
on September 30, 1980."8
As the Enrolled Bill Report suggests, the statute is poorly
worded. Section 593(e) is limited to persons who engage in the
willful manufacture, distribution and sale of decoders "for
profit."" Following enactment of section 593(e), a Santa Clara
entrepreneur incorporated as a non-profit corporation and
sold its decoders as part of a contributor's membership fee."
Furthermore, the statute does not deal with an entrepreneur
who sells a decoder at a loss and, thus, operates outside the
statute's scope.
The prohibition against selling any "plan" with the intent
to facilitate decoding of STV transmissions potentially vio-
lates first amendment freedom of the press protections since
it acts as a prior restraint. For example, Radio Electronics
contains an article entitled "Build This Pay-TV Decoder"; s' it
provides complete schematics and a parts list for the con-
struction of a simple decoder. The article offers readers step
51. Enrolled Bill Report on A.B. 3475, Legal Affairs Department, Office of the
Governor (Sept. 26, 1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
52. See Harris, Pay TV Firms War Against Illegal Decoders, Los Angeles
Times, Aug. 20, 1980, § 4, at 1, col. 3; The Corsairs of Cable, Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, Aug. 26, 1980, § A, at 18, col. 1; Irving & Carroll, Pirated STV Shows
Start Legal Battle, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Aug. 31, 1980, § A,
at 4, col. 1; Yoachum, O'Keefe Promises to Fight Bill Aimed at Bootleg TV, San Jose
Mercury, Sept. 27, 1980, § B, at 2, col. 1.
53. 1980 Cal. Stat. 1332 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(e) (West Supp.
1982)).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(e).
55. See Yoachum, TV 'bootlegger' Turns Into Non-Profit Corporation, San
Jose Mercury, Oct. 9, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 1.
56. Landfear, Build This Pay-TV Decoder, RAnio-ELscTRomcs, Jan., 1981, at
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by step instructions to build a decoder and lists mail order
suppliers who offer necessary parts. 73 Magazine contains a
similar article outlining the steps necessary to build an MDS
receiver.5 7 While MDS transmissions are, strictly speaking,
outside the scope of section 593(e), STV licensees often re-
ceive their programming via a MDS common carrier and sub-
sequently rebroadcast the program to their subscribers.
Hence, the problem presented is the same.
The presumption of unconstitutionality which the U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently applied to prior restraints on
expression,"8 raises serious questions whether the statute ap-
plies to the publication of plan "facilitating interception or
decoding of any over-the-air transmission by an STV service
. . ,"5 The FCC, faced with a similar complaint following
publication of the 73 Magazine article, held that FCC regula-
tions did not prohibit the publication of articles which might
ultimately lead to the commission of acts prohibited by the
Federal Communications Act.60
The statute's prohibition against any device facilitating
decoding of any over-the-air transmission by a subscription
television service potentially affects all standard VHF/UHF
television receivers sold in the United States. The FCC ex-
pressly requires all STV licensees to broadcast, in addition to
their subscription broadcasts, "minimum hours of non-sub-
scription programming." 61 The minimum number of non-sub-
scription programming hours varies depending on the number
of months a station has been in operation, but reaches 28
hours per week after 36 months." Penal Code section 593(e)
does not distinguish between "subscription television broad-
cast programming" and "non-subscription programming."
The statute's broad sweep of "any over-the-air transmission"
57. See Common Carrier Association for Telecommunications, 79 F.C.C.2d 273,
274 (1980), citing Article, You Can Watch Those Secret TV Channels-a complete
MDS receiving system, 73 MAGAZINE Aug. 1979.
58. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). "Any
prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against
its constitutional validity." Id. at 419. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1930).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 593(e).
60. Common Carrier Association for Telecommunications, 79 F.C.C.2d 273, 275-
76 (1980).





clearly encompasses non-subscription programming and would
require that express authorization be granted to all television
manufacturers.
The statute raises a more serious problem in its attempt
to prohibit "decoding." What is television reception if not
"decoding"? A television receiver is a decoder. The receiver
is manufactured to decode electronic pulses and signals and
direct the triggering of an electron beam located inside a cath-
ode ray tube in accordance with the respective signal voltages.
The electron beam gun scans a light sensitive screen at the
rate of 525 lines every 1/30th of a second. In order to produce
a coherent image, the transmissions of all TV broadcast sta-
tions are encoded with vertical, horizontal and blanking
pulses, referred to as synchronizing pulses." These pulses en-
sure that the electron gun of the cathode ray tube begins each
scan at precisely the same time.
There is no novel technology inherent in STV broadcast-
ing. STV transmissions use the same technology but alter the
voltages of the synchronizing pulses so that standard televi-
sion receivers are incapable of properly reconstituting the
video image. The STV decoder recognizes the non-standard
synchronizing pulse and feeds that information to the electron
gun.5
To summarize, an understanding of television electronics
is important in placing the legislation in its proper perspec-
tive. Section 593(e) does not protect contract or property
rights; it directly regulates broadcasting. "Broadcasting re-
mains broadcasting even though a segment of the public is un-
able to view programs without special equipment." e
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE "OBSTACLE TO ACCOMPLISH-
MENT" TEST
In enacting the Federal Communications Act of 1934
63. "A television camera is a device that accepts information concerning the
scene to which it is exposed, including the sound that accompanies that scene, and
encodes it in the form of an electric current. A television receiver is a matching device
that decodes the electric current and converts it into a succession of pictures on a
cathode ray tube ... " SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE
11 (1971).
64. G. KRAVITZ, BAsIc TV COURSE 47-48 (1962).
65. Landfear, supra note 56, at 42.
66. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 10.
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(FCA),67 Congress established the Federal Communications
Commission "for the purpose of regulating interstate ...
commerce in communications by . . radio so as to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States, a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide ... radio
communication service."6 The U.S. Supreme Court has con-
sistently upheld the broad authority and comprehensive man-
date of the FCC to regulate all forms of electrical communica-
tions and to develop an appropriate system of local television
broadcasting.0 9 While it has been held that Congress, in enact-
ing the FCA, "completely occupied and preempted the field of
interstate communications in radio and television,' 70 it is now
generally conceded that the FCA and the FCC have not pre-
empted the entire field of radio communications.71
No infallible constitutional litmus test exists by which
section 593(e)'s validity can be measured. As the United
States Supreme Court remarked over 40 years ago in voiding
the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act in Hines v. Davido-
witz,7 2 the primary consideration in testing the state laws' va-
lidity against the constitutional command of the Supremacy
Clause "is to determine whether, under the circumstances of
this particular case, [the state statute] stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. '7' The Court still follows this test in resolving pre-
emption issues.
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a series
of well defined tests for determining whether state legislation
is preempted by federal law. In Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 4 the Court upheld a California law
which set minimum standards for retail sales of avocados.
Federal regulations, enacted by the Department of Agricul-
ture, also set minimum standards for the marketing of avoca-
67. Federal Communications Act, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 151.
69. E.g. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968).
70. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928, 934 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), afl'd, 274 F.2d
705 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 380 (1960).
71. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1963).
72. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
73. Id. at 67.
74. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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dos. 5 In discussing whether the state statute must yield to the
federal superintendence of the field, the Court interpreted the
Hines directive to mean that there must either be "such ac-
tual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both
cannot stand in the same area. . . [or] . . . evidence of a con-
gressional design to preempt the field." '7 6
As other courts have noted,7 the Florida Lime Court es-
tablished a two part preemption test. Actual conflict between
the two schemes of regulation could be shown by (a) physical
impossibility, or (b) the nature of the subject matter which
demanded exclusive federal regulation. Congressional design
to preempt could only be sustained by an explicit declaration
of congressional intent to displace state regulation. 8 While
the Court embraced the Hines preemption standard, it also
limited its reach. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of
five justices, commented that "[t]he test . . . is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal su-
perintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at sim-
ilar or different objectives. 79 Clearly, this statement referred
to the Hines directive which considered the "full purposes
and objectives" of Congress.
Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners"0 further re-
fined the Hines/Florida Lime preemption test. In Head, the
Court upheld a state law regulating radio advertising in the
face of arguments that Congress had preempted the field by
enacting the Federal Communications Act. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, cursorily referred to the "obstacle to
accomplishment" analogy of Hines and Florida Lime, arguing
instead that the state statute directly addressed the protec-
tion of public health, an area traditionally within the state's
police power.'
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, set out three
separate tests for sustaining federal preemption. The first two
tests paralleled those he enunciated in Florida Lime. Under
75. Id. at 139. See 22 Fed. Reg. 6205 (1955), (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 51.3050-
51.3053, 51.3064 (1980)).
76. 373 U.S. at 141.
77. People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 264, 522 P.2d 1049, 1050, 114 Cal. Rptr.
241, 243 (1974).
78. 373 U.S. at 142 (1963).
79. Id.
80. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
81. Id. at 428.
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the third test, preemption would be sustained by a showing of
"a conflict either in purpose or in operation between the state
and federal regulations involved." 82 The reference to a "con-
flict in purpose" was again directed at Hines and reflected a
retreat from his comments in Florida Lime. Justice Brennan's
opinion in Head v. New Mexico gave the "obstacle to accom-
plishment" test an independent footing in subsequent analy-
ses of federal preemption issues.
A decade later, in De Canas v. Bica,83 the Court con-
fronted the issue of whether the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) preempted a California statute concerning employ-
ment of illegal aliens.8 4 The Court held that no clear and man-
ifest demonstration existed which showed that Congress had
intended to oust all state authority to regulate the area, the
second Florida Lime test. The Court, however, remanded the
case to determine whether the state statute was unconstitu-
tional because it impeded "the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in enacting
the INA. 85
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.8e firmly established the "ob-
stacle to accomplishment" preemption test. The Court held
that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted a
California statute which regulated the weight of packaged
consumer commodities. The Court cited an explicit preemp-
tion provision in the FMIA and held that its decision in Flor-
ida Lime mandated preemption where "Congress' command is
explicitly stated in the statute's language."8" When faced with
whether the Federal Packaging and Labelling Act (FPLA)
preempted the same California statute as applied to a differ-
ent commodity, the Court did not resolve the explicit preemp-
tion issue and found the manufacturers possessed no "physi-
cal impossibility" in meeting both the state and federal
packaging requirements.88 Instead, the Court held that state
enforcement would prevent "the accomplishment and execu-
82. Id. at 445 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
84. Id. at 352-53.
85. Id. at 363.
86. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
87. Id. at 525. Explicit Congressional command is not the only situation which
mandates preemption. The result is compelled when Congressional command is "im-
plicitly contained" in the statute. Id.
88. Id. at 534.
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tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in pass-
ing the FPLA and that the state law must yield to the fed-
eral."9 The Court found a conflict of purpose between the
state and federal regulations. The FPLA goal was to facilitate
value comparisons among similar products. Enforcement of
the state regulation would frustrate this goal."
When FCC regulation of STV is considered in the context
of these United States Supreme Court preemption tests, the
issue of whether section 593(e) must yield to the federal su-
perintendence of the field can be easily framed. There is
neither an explicit declaration of congressional design in the
FCA to displace state regulation in its entirety, nor is the sub-
ject matter one "by its very nature admitting only of national
supervision.""' The real question is whether enforcement of
Penal Code section 593(e) stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of
Congress in enacting the FCA and awarding the FCC jurisdic-
tion over STV. While the courts have upheld FCC authority
to regulate STV,92 apparently no court has decided the nar-
rower issue of whether FCC regulation of STV preempts state
and local regulation of STV, in general, and STV receiver
equipment, specifically.
89. Id. at 543. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1977) (fol-
lowing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
90. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dubno, 492 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd,
639 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully, 499
F. Supp. 888 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) afl'd, 653 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1981) vacated as moot, 455
U.S. 245 (1982), invalidating New York and Connecticut taxes on oil company reve-
nues derived from business activities conducted within the state, based on the
Supremacy Clause:
[I]t should be noted that a state law cannot escape invalidation on pre-
emption grounds because its purpose promotes a valid state interest if
its effect 'frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law.' Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971). Applying the Hines test, the Court has
persistently invalidated state legislation that 'frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal law,' [citation omitted] that betrays a 'general incom-
patability with basic federal objectives,' . . . [citation omitted] . . . or
whose 'consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal pro-
gram' to result in 'frustration to federal policy'. .. [citation omitted].
Id. at 897.
91. Head, 374 U.S. at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. See Nat'l Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
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V. FCC PRONOUNCEMENTS AND HISTORY OF STV
Active FCC consideration of subscription television began
in February 1955, with a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking"
inviting public comment relative to the Commission's author-
ity to license subscription television operations.9 8 The Com-
mission received over 25,000 letters in response to its invita-
tion."' In May 1957, the Commission concluded it had "the
authority to authorize the use of television broadcast frequen-
cies for subscription television operations if. . .it would be in
the public interest to do so."" Five months later the FCC is-
sued its First Report on subscription television.9 6
The Commission summarized the legal basis for its con-
clusion that it had statutory authority to regulate STV. The
Report cited the Federal Communications Act, which man-
dates that "the Commission, from time to time, as public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . (e)
[r]egulate the kind of apparatus to be used . . . and (g)
[s]tudy new uses for radio ...and generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest. 9 7
With this statutory basis, the Commission authorized the be-
ginning of limited STV trial operations.
In February 1958, the Commission issued its Second Re-
port and Order suspending processing of STV applications
until the end of 1958.98 In a Third Report and Order issued in
March 1959, the Commission set forth additional conditions
for STV trial operations." The Commission also concluded
that STV receiving equipment would be leased to the public,
so as not to require the public to purchase additional equip-
ment not needed for the reception of "free television
broadcasts. "100
In June 1962, WHCT in Hartford, Connecticut, began
93. 20 Fed. Reg. 988 (1955).
94. 22 Fed. Reg. 3758, 3759 (1957).
95. Id.
96. First Report, supra note 20, at 265.
97. 47 U.S.C. § 303(e) (1976). The Commission specifically cited to 47 U.S.C. §
301, 303(b), (e), (g) and 307 as statutory authority for its ruling. First Report, supra
note 20, at 536.
98. See Third Report, supra note 22. The one year suspension was subse-
quently extended until the end of the 86th Congress in 1959. Id. at 265.
99. Id. at 270-74.
100. Id. at 266.
[Vol. 22854
SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION
limited STV operations.101 The Commission first reviewed the
preliminary data of the Hartford experiment in its "Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry," in
March 1966.102 In this report the FCC held STV to be "broad-
casting" within the meaning of section 153(o) of the FCA.
The primary touchstone of a broadcast service is the in-
tent of the broadcaster to provide radio and television
program service without discrimination to as many mem-
bers of the general public as can be interested in the par-
ticular program .... While particular subscription pro-
grams might have a special appeal to some segment of the
potential audience, this is equally true of a substantial
portion of the programming now transmitted by broad-
casting stations.108
The Commission also observed that a broadcaster's requisite
intent may be inferred "from the circumstances under which
material is transmitted." 0 Neither the number of potential
viewers nor the fact that a charge is collected from subscribers
was determinative.105
The Commission's Fourth Report and Order was adopted
in December 1968.106 It is the single most important document
in the history of STV regulation because the FCC concluded
it was in the public interest to establish a permanent, nation-
wide STV system.107 In addition to reaffirming that the Com-
mission had authority to regulate STV operations and that
STV was indeed "broadcasting" within the meaning of the
FCA, the Report held STV licensees were bound by all rules
applicable to free TV broadcast stations and discussed the
need for competition among STV decoder entrepreneurs. 10 8
Codification of the Fourth Report and Order 0' extended
101. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 2.
102. Id. FCC authority to authorize the experimental Hartford STV operation
was upheld in Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962).
103. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 9.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to
Provide for Subscription Television Service - Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d
466 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Report].
107. Id. at 505.
108. Id. at 575-76.
109. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643(d) (1969) (current version at 47 C.F.R. § 73.643(b)
(1980)).
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all rules applicable to regular television broadcasting to STV.
There the Commission interpreted broadcasting as an "in-
tent" to provide programming without discrimination to all
members of the general public. The Commission would infer
the "intent" to broadcast by applying the fairness doctrine,
the equal-time doctrine, chain broadcasting rules, license re-
newal regulations and prohibitions against unauthorized pub-
lication of communications except broadcast communications.
The Commission also adopted rules requiring that STV
decoder equipment be leased to subscribers. A closer reading
of the Fourth Report reveals that these rules were promul-
gated to protect subscribers, not licensees."10 The FCC limited
the exclusive decoder leasing franchise granted STV licensees
by noting that "should STV flourish and become a regular
part of the television scene, a continued leasing requirement
could mean that subscribers would pay in continued rental
fees more than it would cost to buy the decoding equip-
ment." ' The Commission was concerned that if licensees
were always allowed to lease decoders, their control over re-
ception equipment could add to the local STV licensees' mo-
nopoly power; the Commission was committed to letting "the
marketplace . . . regulate the charges that are paid" for
STV.1 1 2
The FCC issued a Fifth Report and Order concerning
over-the-air subscription television in June 1969. ' In it, the
Commission adopted rules governing Commission acceptance
of STV technical systems and STV licensee applications.
A. National Association of Theatre Owners v. FCC
FCC jurisdiction over subscription television was upheld
in National Association of Theatre Owners v. FCC."4 The
case is noteworthy because it discusses the expansive powers
Congress granted the Commission in enacting the Federal
Communications Act. Citing National Broadcasting Co. v.
110. Fourth Report, supra note 106, at 492.
111. Id. at 552.
112. Id. at 548.
113. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to
Provide for Subscription Television Service - Fifth Report and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d
559 (1969).
114. 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
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United States,1 5 the circuit court reemphasized that the Act
gave the Commission "not niggardly, but expansive powers
S.. [in order to] . . . encourage the larger and more effective
use of radio in the public interest." ' 6 The court held that the
FCA was designed to foster diversity in the organization and
operation of broadcasting stations and that the Commission
"did not exceed its authority in concluding that subscription
television is entirely consistent with these goals." '
The court also noted that the idea of paying for broadcast
services through direct charges was not without precedent in
the United States. In reviewing the legislative history of the
Act and its predecessor, the Radio Act of 1927,18 the court
found nothing which "preclude[d] the Commission from ap-
proving a system of direct charges to the public as a means of
financing broadcasting services."'1
B. FCC Preemption of State Regulation in Other Pay TV
Media
The courts have carved out certain areas in which the
FCA and FCC do preempt local regulation of television and
radio broadcasting.'20 Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly'2 '
was the first case to discuss the issue of FCC authority to pre-
empt state and local regulation of programming for which per-
channel charges were made. The case concerned the New
York state legislature's attempt to regulate franchising and
115. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
116. 420 F.2d at 199.
117. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
118. 420 F.2d at 202.
119. Id.
120. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1957) (FCC has
exclusive jurisdiction over broadcast license grants, revocations and transfers); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940) (FCA preempts state regu-
lation of radio frequency allocations); Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d
765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979) (FCC has authority to preempt
state price regulation of pay cable programming and pay cable programming); North
Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1927 (1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) (FCC authority to regulate equip-
ment used for both interstate and local communications preempts state and local reg-
ulation of same equipment); Allen B. Dumont Labs v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951) (FCA preempted state regulation of censor-
ship and broadcast programming content). But see Schroeder v. Municipal Ct., 73
Cal. App. 3d 841, 141 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1977) (local land use regulations of antenna
height were not precluded by FCC regulation of radio transmissions).
121. 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
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rate setting procedures of pay or subscription cable services.
The court reviewed FCC pronouncements in the area of spe-
cial pay cable programming and concluded that the FCC in-
tended to refrain from imposing rate regulation for such ser-
vices so as to permit special programming development free of
price restraints and thereby foster program diversity.
The court held that "the FCC has the authority to pre-
empt state and local price regulation of special pay cable pro-
gramming [and] that it has exercised this authority . . .,.
The court based its holding on the analysis of United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co.128 and United States v. Midwest
Video Corp.12" These United States Supreme Court cases up-
held FCC authority to regulate cable television to the extent
that such regulation was "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting."""5 The Brookhaven
court interpreted these two decisions to mean that the FCC
had the authority to preempt state and local regulation in any
specific area in which the Commission's regulations furthered
a goal it was entitled to pursue in the broadcasting field. FCC
authority to preempt was exercised by pronouncements evi-
dencing an attempt to preempt state and local regulation.
Less than seven months later, the FCC cited the Brook-
haven and National Association of Theatre Owners decisions
in a Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Orth-O-Vision,
Inc.,'2 holding that state regulation of MDS services and fa-
cilities was preempted. The FCC stated that "[no] state may
regulate an intrastate entity where its regulation would inter-
fere with the reception of interstate radio communications.
1 2 7
Furthermore, the Commission held that even if the explicit
provisions of the Communications Act could not be consid-
ered to preempt the state regulations in question, preemption
should be inferred along the lines of Jones v. Rath Packing
Co. and the obstacle to accomplishment test.
12 8
122. Id. at 767.
123. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
124. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
125. 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
126. In re Orth-O-Vision, Inc. - Petition for a Declaratory Ruling, 69 F.C.C.2d
657 (1978).
127. Id. at 668.
128. Id. at 669.
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While Brookhaven concerned cable TV, and the FCC
Memorandum in Orth-O-Vision concerned MDS service, their
holdings should be extended and applied to STV. Both deci-
sions recognize the broad congressional mandate granted the
Commission. California Penal Code section 593(e) exemplifies
state regulation in an area where the Commission has exer-
cised its authority to preempt by means of "policy state-
ments" concerning the regulation of STV decoders.1 29
C. FCA Prohibition Against Unauthorized Interception of
Radio Communications Exempts STV Transmissions
When the FCC concluded, in its Fourth Report and Or-
der, that the rules applicable to regular broadcasting would
apply to subscription television, it expressly referred to sec-
tion 605.180 Derived primarily from its counterpart in the Ra-
dio Act of 1927,131 section 605 provides that "no person not
entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any inter-
state. . . communication by radio and use such communica-
tion . . . for his own benefit .... ,,""2 The final sentence of
the statute exempts "any radio communication which is
broadcast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of
the general public" ss from the prohibition of the section.
To what extent section 605's protections extend to STV
decoder retailers and manufacturers depends on whether STV
is "broadcasting." If STV is considered "broadcasting" within
the meaning of section 605, STV decoder manufacturers and
129. The Brookhaven court stated: "[W]e do not believe that the FCC's choice
to proceed by means of policy statements and interpretations rather than formal reg-
ulations vitiates its attempt to preempt." 573 F.2d at 768.
130. Fourth Report, supra note 106, at 573 (citing Further Notice, supra note 7,
at 11.
131. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 27, 44 Stat. 1172 (repealed 1934).
132. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). The relevant portions provide:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio
communication and divulge or publish the.. . contents. . . or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not being
entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate . . .
communication by radio and use such communication . . . for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto ....
Id. It is generally conceded that 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976) (defining radio communica-
tions) includes television. See Allen B. Dumont Labs v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
133. 47 U.S.C. § 605. "This section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging,
publishing or utilizing [of] the contents of any radio communication which is broad-
cast or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public." Id.
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retailers can assist others in receiving interstate communica-
tions without fear of federal prosecution. The Commission has
repeatedly found STV to be "broadcasting" within the mean-
ing of the FCA and has specifically held section 605 to be as
applicable to STV as it is to regular television. The general
rule is that a statute's construction "should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong."1" The com-
mon sense application of this rule requires that STV be in-
cluded within the definition of "broadcasting" for the pur-
poses of section 605.
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, " ' the
leading case on the application of section 605 to subscription
television, rejected this argument. Plaintiffs in the case were
licensees of WXON-TV, channel 20, a Detroit, Michigan sub-
scription television station. Defendants were various electron-
ics equipment retailers, who were also selling decoders. The
court granted plaintiff's motion enjoining defendants from
selling decoders, holding that STV is not broadcasting within
the meaning of section 605 of the FCA. "' The court found
an important distinction between making a service availa-
ble to the general public and intending a program for the
use of the general public .... The dual nature of STV is
that while it may be available to the general public, it is
intended for the exclusive use of paying subscribers.
Availability and use are separate concepts. "'
The court's discussion of the "intent" of STV licensees is con-
trary to FCC analysis of the issue undertaken in its 1966 Fur-
ther Notice and 1968 Fourth Report. As previously noted, "in-
134. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
135. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 465. While no case appears to have dealt with the issue, an argument
can be made that the phrase "for the use of the general public," in the proviso of
section 605, does not modify "broadcast" but rather "radio communications ...
transmitted by amateurs or others." Such a construction would be in line with section
605 as enacted, Federal Communications Act ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934):
"This section shall not apply to the receiving . . . of any radio communications
broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public,
.... " (The comma following "broadcast" was deleted by Pub. L. 90-351, Title III, §
803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968), current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)). Interpretation of
section 605 so as to read "for the use of the general public" as modifying "broadcast"
is redundant. Broadcasting is defined in section 153(o) of the Communications Act to
include "dissemination . . . intended to be received by the public." No basis exists
for differentiating between the language of the two statutes.
137. 637 F.2d at 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
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tent" is to be inferred from the circumstances under which
the material is transmitted, including whether or not FCC
rules applicable to "regular" broadcasting are applicable to
the service in question. The subjective "intent" of the STV
licensee that its programming is for the exclusive use of pay-
ing subscribers is not determinative. Furthermore, the court's
finding that "the FCC has not ruled specifically on the ques-
tion whether STV is to be considered 'broadcasting' for the
purposes of section 605"'1" is clearly erroneous.
Even if STV is not considered broadcasting within the
meaning of section 605, judicial precedent upholds the sec-
tion's prohibitions as inapplicable to interception of STV sig-
nals. In Weiss v. United States,' 9 the United States Supreme
Court focused on the language of section 605. While the case
concerned the wiretapping of phone conversations, the Court
found the statutory construction of section 605 was just as ap-
plicable to interception of radio transmissions. The Court
noted that section 605 "consists of four clauses separated by
semicolons," each clause complete in itself.'4 0 The first and
third clauses, now sentences,' 4' deal with divulgence of
messages by authorized persons engaged in receiving or trans-
mitting radio signals. These clauses are inapplicable to STV
decoder manufacturers as they are not persons authorized to
receive and transmit radio signals. Clauses two and four con-
cern interception of radio transmissions. Clause two is also in-
applicable to STV decoder manufacturers as it requires two
separate acts - interception and divulgence. STV decoder
manufacturers do not personally divulge the existence, con-
tents or meaning of any intercepted communication. It is sec-
tion 605's fourth clause, prohibiting one who has "become ac-
quainted with the contents . . . or meaning of such
communication [or any part thereof] knowing that such com-
munication was intercepted. . .[from] . . .us[ing] such com-
munication . . . for his own benefit or the benefit of another
not entitled thereto," 42 which appears to control the STV de-
138. Id. at 464. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
140. Id. at 327.
141. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1934)).
142. See, Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vending
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coder manufacturers' conduct.
Historically, section 605 has been used as an evidentiary
rule to determine the admissibility of testimony or transcripts
of telephone wiretaps or radio transmission interceptions. 4 3 It
has not been used to prohibit the sale or manufacture of arti-
cles of commerce.'4 4 In fact a number of radio devices sold are
capable of violating section 605, such as shortwave radios and
police and fire scanner devices. It would stretch section 605 to
absurd lengths to argue that the section should be used to
prohibit the manufacture and sales of "staple items" of
commerce.'
4
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 39 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
143. See, Benati v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) (testimony as to the exis-
tence of intercepted phone conversations obtained by tapping telephone wires inad-
missible under § 605) (". . . the plain words of the statute created a prohibition
against any persons violating the integrity of a system of telephonic communication
and that evidence obtained in violation of this prohibition may not be used to secure
a federal conviction"); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (transcripts of
intercepted telephone conversations obtained by tapping telephone wires inadmissi-
ble under § 605); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (testimony as to the
content of intercepted phone messages obtained by tapping telephone wires inadmis-
sible under § 605); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 879 (1969) (records of toll calls placed from telephone obtained from tele-
phone company admissible under § 605); United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th
Cir. 1955), alf'd, 351 U.S. 916 (1956) (recordings and transcripts of intercepted radio
transmissions obtained by monitoring defendant's transmissions inadmissible under §
605) (Judge Chambers notes that while § 605 is not designated as a rule of evidence,
"it becomes, however, a rule of evidence for federal courts by judicial construction."
Id. at 284).
144. In KMLA Broadcast Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vending Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967), the defendant, a cigarette vendor, offered to supply
its accounts with radio tuners capable of receiving background music broadcasts of
plaintiff. These background music broadcasts, licensed by the FCC as Subsidiary
Communications Authorization [SCA] operations, had been held by the Commission
to be point to point communications and not broadcasting within the meaning of §
153(o). Defendant provided the tuners to its accounts free of charge and serviced the
tuners. Id. at 39. Hence, the defendant had a continuing involvement in the unautho-
rized interception of its customers. The case can therefore be distinguished from out-
right sales of equipment. Interestingly, the manufacturer of the tuners was not joined
in the action. See also L.D. O'Neill, Interception of MDS/Satellite Communication,
United States Dept. of Commerce (Jan. 18, 1980) (on file with the Santa Clara Law
Review).
145. This argument was originally advanced in Universal City Studios v. Sony
Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981) cert.
granted, 102 S.Ct. 2926 (1982). There, plaintiffs were film and television program
producers who alleged that sales of defendant's Betamax product, which enabled con-
sumers to record, edit and playback television programs, would act to decrease the
value of their copyrights. Plaintiffs charged Sony with contributory copyright in-
fringement in manufacturing and selling videotape recorders capable of being used
for copyright infringement purposes. The district court held that defendant's sales of
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The Chartwell opinion also disapproved of two recent
federal district court opinions, National Subscription Televi-
sion v. S&H TV146 and Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. H.B.O.14 7 The
facts in the NST controversy paralleled those in Chartwell.
National Subscription Television filed suit against S&H TV
and six retail electronics outlets for manufacturing and selling
components and plans to be utilized in intercepting plaintiff's
STV signals. The district court held that the FCC had
"clearly implied that subscription TV would be exempt from
the prohibition of section 605I'' M and correctly cited both the
1966 Further Notice and the 1968 Fourth Report. The Orth-
O-Vision opinion, which was concerned with MDS transmis-
sions, accepted that STV was broadcasting within the mean-
ing of section 605 and also cited the FCC Fourth Report dis-
cussion on "intent."149
In an opinion which relied heavily on Chartwell, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court de-
cision in NST.150 Attorneys for National Subscription Televi-
sion willingly conceded that programming which meets the re-
quirements of section 153(o) broadcasting also constitutes
broadcasting within the meaning of the proviso to section
605.1" The court, however, citing Chartwell, held that one
could broadcast with the intent that its signal be received by
the public within the meaning of section 153(o) "without such
broadcasting being for the use of the public within the mean-
its Betamax was insufficient basis for copyright infringement liability:
Selling a staple article of commerce - e.g., a typewriter, a recorder, a
camera, a photocopying machine - technically contributes to any in-
fringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,'
if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would expand the theory be-
yond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management. . . . Com-
merce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were
held liable as contributory infringers whenever they 'constructively'
knew that some purchasers on some occasions would use their product
for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first impression
to be an infringement.
480 F. Supp. at 461. The court of appeals expressly rejected the applicability of the
"staple item of commerce" theory to the manufacture and sale of video tape record-
ers. 659 F.2d at 975.
146. No. CV 80-829-LTL (C.D. Cal., Aug. 4, 1980).
147. 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
148. No. CV 80-829-LTL, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 4, 1980).
149. 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
150. National Subscription Television v. S&H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 823.
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ing of the proviso [to section 605]."12 The opinion fails to dis-
tinguish between the licensee's subjective intent in transmit-
ting programming "for the use of the general public" and the
FCC's objective criteria in inferring "the intent of the broad-
caster to provide radio or television service without discrimi-
nation to as many members of the general public as can be
interested in the particular program. . . . "15 The broad-
caster's subjective intent cannot control determination of
whether programming is broadcasting as this would under-
mine all FCC regulation of television and radio.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit opinion misconstrues the
public policy arguments recognized by the FCC in promoting
STV. The prohibition against STV licensee sales of receivers
was not promulgated to protect "the economic viability of the
STV industry.""" The FCC always intended STV to compete
in the open market with commercial television.'" Moreover,
the activities of the defendant in NST do not threaten the
economic viability of the STV industry any more than sales of
video cassettes of first run movies threaten the economic via-
bility of the movie theatre industry.
While FCC regulations prohibiting the sale of STV re-
ceivers by station licensees arguably protect subscribers from
investing large sums of money in a device which is likely to
become obsolete and give subscribers flexibility to choose
among various STV decoders, this argument does not extend
to non-STV subscribers freely purchasing STV decoders from
non-STV licensees. In fact, the FCC has historically en-
couraged such sales so as to let free marketplace forces control
STV.
The United States Supreme Court has not defined
"broadcasting" but it has identified the attributes of "broad-
casters." Specifically, broadcasters procure and select the pro-
grams to be viewed and propogate them to the public.1"6
While this definition was offered in the context of distinguish-
ing broadcasting from cable television, the Court's desire for
152. Id. at 824.
153. Further Notice, supra note 7, at 9.
154. 644 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1981).
155. Fourth Report, supra note 106, at 548. See supra notes 110-12 and accom-
panying text.
156. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 403 (1973); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968).
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an uncomplicated definition belies the Chartwell approach of
splitting hairs, especially since "the Communications Act is
not notable for the precision of its substantive standards.
15 7
D. FCC Deregulation of Satellite Earth Stations
The FCC has completely deregulated the ownership and
use of receive-only earth stations, for reception of satellite
communications.' 8 Licensing is now voluntary and the risks
of signal interference are now borne exclusively by the earth
station operator. In adopting this position, the Commission
ruled that receive-only earth station facilities should be ex-
empt from regulation and would be ignored in future spec-
trum management decisions.159 The Commission rejected the
programmers' and satellite subscribers' argument that the
FCC retain the option of revoking an operator's license under
section 605 if the dish owner intercepted satellite radio com-
munications. The Commission concluded that since all domes-
tic satellites are classified as "fixed," not broadcasting satel-
lites, effective civil remedies existed to enforce section 605.
The FCC's deregulation of receive-only earth station
satellites to allow "marketplace forces to function freely in an
unregulated arena"160 reflects an overall trend towards der-
egulation of signal reception equipment and makes it more
difficult to justify further delay in deregulating STV decoder
sales. A recent FCC Public Notice ambiguously cautioned
manufacturers and sellers of non-approved STV decoders."'
While the Commission warned that STV decoders are part of
a complete communications system required to be approved
by the FCC, it did not refer to its own rules which require the
leasing of subscription television decoders. In addition, the
Commission failed to refer specifically to section 605; however,
it did rely on sections 302a and 303e.
Section 302a was added to the FCA in 1968.162 The pur-
157. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969).
158. See Satellite Deregulation, supra note 30.
159. Id. at 213.
160. Id. at 214.
161. Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, Manufacturers and
Sellers of Non-Approved Subscription Television (STV) Decoders are Cautioned
(Aug. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Public Notice).
162. 47 U.S.C. § 302a (1976) (originally enacted as Act of July 5, 1968, ch. 642, §
302, 82 Stat. 290).
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pose of the legislation was to give the FCC authority to deal
with radio interference problems caused by the expanding use
of devices emmitting radio frequency signals.'6 3  Section
302a(b) prohibits the manufacture and sale of such devices
which fail to comply with FCC "type approval" technical re-
quirements.' 64 The technical performance regulations do not
require the consent of individual STV licensees prior to FCC
approval. As the Commission noted, its regulations concerning
subscription television equipment "are predicated on consid-
erations of spectrum efficiency, prevention and minimization
of harmful interference to authorized radio and television, as
well as protection of the consumer against products which will
degrade television reception performance.' 1 66 Noticeably ab-
sent in this policy pronouncement is a concern over the con-
tract rights of STV station licensees.
VI. RECENT LITIGATION
The constitutionality of section 593(e) was upheld in its
first court challenge, Robbins v. Hicks.'16 Though the case
facts paralleled those in Chartwell and National Subscription
Television,167 the decision's basis is unclear. The court's two
page order denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary re-
straining order staying prosecution under section 593(e)
states: "§ 593(e) of the Penal Code is an exercise of the police
power [of the state] in an area not fully preempted by federallaw.,,168
The State Attorney General's office and the Orange
County Prosecutor argued that section 593(e) did not inter-
fere with any federal purpose.6 9 The arguments advanced by
163. S. REP. No. 1276, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2486.
164. See STV Equipment and Technical System Performance Requirements, 47
C.F.R. § 73.644(b) (1979) ("system type acceptance" regulations applicable to STV
decoders).
165. Public Notice, supra note 161.
166. No. 34-30-12 (Orange County Super. Ct., Nov. 26, 1980).
167. Stephen Robbins, the plaintiff in Robbins, was also a named defendant in
Chartwell and National Subscription Television.
168. No. 34-30-12, slip op. at 2.
169. Points and Authorities for Defendant George Deukmejian, as Attorney
General, State of California at 7-9, Robbins v. Hicks, No. 34-30-12 (Orange County
Super. Ct., Nov. 26, 1980); Points and Authorities for Defendants Cecil Hicks and




both parties relied heavily on People v. Conklin,1 0 a preemp-
tion case dealing with state and federal wiretapping laws.
While the Conklin court correctly applied the "obstacle to ac-
complishment" test in holding California's Invasion of Privacy
Act not preempted by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,' the case is still distinguishable. In
Conklin, there was no conflict between the state and federal
regulations, both were geared to protecting the privacy of wire
and oral communications. The purpose of section 593(e) in
prohibiting the sale of STV decoders is to protect the prop-
erty and contract rights of STV licensees and to combat what
the state and STV licensees feel is "piracy. '172 The purpose
behind FCC regulation of STV television decoders is to pro-
tect the consumer and subscriber.
Section 593(e) criminal charges were filed against the
same Santa Ana electronics retailer in People v. Robbins.17 3
The complaint was originally dismissed, based on "reserva-
tions concerning the law's validity" and the NST district
court opinion.'7 4 The Orange County District Attorney ap-
pealed and the Municipal Court judgment was reversed. 7 5 On
remand, the defendant was found guilty of contempt of court;
the section 593(e) charges were dropped. 76
In People v. Abel,'7 7 another section 593(e) criminal
prosecution filed in Orange County, undercover police officers
entered defendant's television and stereo shop and purchased
a STV decoder kit from Mr. Abel. Section 593(e) charges were
170. 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974).
171. Id. at 269-70, 522 P.2d at 1055-56, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
172. Characterization of decoder entrepreneurs as "pirates" is unwarranted. If
reception of STV transmissions is protected under section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act, then decoder distributors are merely acting as merchants attempting to
exploit a new market. Independent telephone receiver manufacturers are not consid-
ered "pirates," despite the fact their product can only be used in connection with a
subscription service: the local telephone system. The success of independent tele-
phone receiver manufacturers has forced Pacific Telephone Company to recompute
its rate structure to allow for a discount for individuals who own their own phone
rather than lease it from the telephone system.
173. People v. Robbins, No. WPO40795b (West Orange Mun. Ct., filed Feb. 23,
1981).
174. Id. (case dismissed, Mar. 16, 1981).
175. People v. Robbins, No. 33-77 (Santa Ana Super. Ct., judgment rev'd, Oct.
27, 1981).
176. People v. Robbins, No. WPO40795b (West Orange Mun. Ct., Dec. 11,
1981).
177. People v. Abel, No. M-101723 (Harbor Mun. Ct. filed Feb. 19, 1981).
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brought against the defendant but the charges were subse-
quently dropped under a court sanctioned compromise pursu-
ant to California Penal Code section 1378.178
In California Satellite Systems v. Nichols,179 Sacramento
Superior Court Judge Richard Tuttle dismissed section 593(e)
charges brought against a local TV repair shop and nine other
named defendants for selling directional antennas and down
converters capable of intercepting MDS transmissions. The
court held there had been no violation of section 593(e) be-
cause interception of MDS signals was not included within the
statutory proscription against interception of subscription tel-
evision programming.180 Instead, Judge Tuttle issued a tempo-
rary injunction against the defendant's sales of such merchan-
dise based on section 605 of the FCA.
VII. A TELEVISION VIEWER'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In addition to the potential impact of Penal Code section
593(e) on first amendment protections against prior re-
straints,' other issues raised by the statute include whether
individual purchasers of STV decoders are subject to prosecu-
tion under section 593(e). The statute is carefully worded so
as to avoid subjecting individual purchasers of STV decoders
from prosecution. The statute is limited in scope to those per-
sons "who, for profit, knowingly and willfully manufacture,
distribute or sell" decoders.' 82 Any attempt to extend the leg-
islative reach of the statute into the privacy of the home
would create practical and legal problems.
Practically speaking, it may already be impossible to halt
the widespread distribution of STV decoders for personal
home use. The technology is commonplace and the parts are
readily available at local electronics outlets. 88
The United States Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broad-
178. Id. (Oct. 5, 1981).
179. No. 294843 (Sacramento Super. Ct., temporary injunction issued May 13,
1981).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 58, and accompanying text.
182. CAL. PBNAL CODE § 593(c) (West Supp. 1980).
183. Radio-Electronics, supra note 56, provides the necessary schematics for
building an STV decoder, lists the addresses and telephone numbers of two such out-
lets, noting "Visa and Mastercard accepted .... All prices postpaid within contigu-
ous 48 states." Id. at 43.
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casting Co. v. FCC,84 also argues against restricting the tele-
vision viewers' right of access to the airwaves. There the Court
upheld FCC authority to enact the "fairness doctrine," requir-
ing broadcasters to discuss both sides of an issue in presenting
programming to the public. In sustaining the FCC regulation,
the Court characterized the broadcasting medium as one
where "the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters . . . is paramount."' 85 Section 593(e) is a
step in the opposite direction, protecting the broadcaster's
contract rights in a manner which grants the licensee a mo-
nopoly over the frequency and the market. The exclusive li-
cense granted broadcasters to operate on a certain frequency
protects the licensee against unauthorized interference from
other potential broadcasters, not against viewers exercising
their right to receive broadcast signals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Section 593(e) impedes the full implementation of the
Federal Communications Act's goal of protecting the public
interest in broadcasting and impairs the jurisdiction and au-
thority of the Federal Communications Commission in regu-
lating subscription television operations. The thrust of the
Commission's regulation of STV has been to integrate the ser-
vice into the general marketplace of regular broadcasting; sec-
tion 593(e) reverses this trend by supplanting state regulation
for competition. California Penal Code section 593(e) enacts a
subjective standard of licensee approval of reception equip-
ment in contrast to the objective standards of radio communi-
cations interference established in FCA section 302a.
Section 593(e) legislates in an area of critical importance
in the field of television communications - reception of radio
transmissions. It raises troubling first amendment concerns, is
poorly drafted and cannot be enforced effectively.
The problem which section 593(e) addresses is conse-
quential. Unauthorized reception of radio communications is a
development which confronts not only subscription television
licensees, but also subscription satellite broadcasters, who face
similar obstacles in marketing their service to the public. One
184. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
185. Id. at 390.
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solution is to use more sophisticated scrambling technology."s'
Individual states, however, cannot effectively handle the prob-
lem. Congress has mandated the FCC to regulate all forms of
electrical communication and to develop an appropriate sys-
tem of local television broadcasting. Furthermore, it granted
the FCC comprehensive and expansive powers for the effec-
tive performance of its responsibilities. Therefore, only the
FCC can attack this issue.
The unauthorized reception problem, coupled with recent
technological advancements which have further expanded the
usable broadcast frequency spectrum, focus attention on the
need to redefine broadcasting and the rights of viewers, licen-
sees and programmers. Penal Code section 593(e) does not of-
fer a reasoned solution.
M. Manuel Fishman
186. Perle, supra note 31, at 337.
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